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Une schizoanalyse du cinéma
est-elle possible ?
Ian Buchanan
RÉSUMÉ
Une schizoanalyze du cinéma est-elle possible ? Cette question
découle d’un constat : l’absence apparente de continuité entre
deux ouvrages que Deleuze a écrits en collaboration avec
Guattari, L’anti-Œdipe et Mille plateaux, et deux de ses ouvrages
suivants, Cinéma 1 et Cinéma 2. Elle repose aussi sur le fait que
les auteurs de L’anti-Œdipe et de Mille plateaux se réfèrent sou-
vent au cinéma pour développer et exemplifier les nouveaux
concepts qu’ils créent dans ces ouvrages. Le présent article met
en lumière trois de ces concepts. Deleuze et Guattari prétendent
que les concepts-clés de la schizoanalyse (le corps sans organes, la
machine abstraite et l’agencement) peuvent s’appliquer à « tout
objet » ; dès lors, ils devraient pouvoir s’appliquer au cinéma
également. C’est justement la grande malléabilité de ces concepts
qui les rend intéressants pour les études cinématographiques. Par
ailleurs, ils permettent de penser le cinéma sans avoir à se référer
aux fictions de l’identification, de la reconnaissance et du fan-
tasme. Pour cette raison, il est possible d’envisager que Cinéma 1
et Cinéma 2 soient déjà, dans une mesure qui reste à déterminer,
des ouvrages schizoanalytiques. L’auteur du présent article fait
un lien direct entre le cinéma et la schizoanalyse, en soulignant
l’importance du délire dans l’un comme dans l’autre, et démon-
tre que la voie royale vers une schizoanalyse du cinéma passe par
le délire plutôt que par le rêve et le fantasme. Il montre ensuite
comment la conceptualisation du délire comme « système de
signes » permet de constituer une nouvelle sémiologie du
 cinéma.
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Is a Schizoanalysis 
of Cinema Possible?
Ian Buchanan
ABSTRACT
Is a schizoanalysis of cinema possible? This question arises from
the observation that there is no apparent continuity between
Deleuze’s two-volume collaboration with Guattari, Anti-Oedipus
and A Thousand Plateaus, and the books he wrote afterwards,
Cinema 1 and Cinema 2. It is also prompted by the observation
that Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus seem to rely a great
deal on cinema in order to develop and exemplify the many new
concepts these books introduce. This paper highlights three such
instances in their work. The fact is, Deleuze and Guattari claim
that the core schizoanalytic concepts of the body without
organs, the abstract machine and assemblage can account for “all
things”; as such, these concepts must account for cinema too. It
is the sheer expansiveness of these concepts that makes them
attractive to cinema studies. Not only that, they promise a way
of engaging with cinema that isn’t reliant on the fictions of iden-
tification, recognition and fantasy. In this sense we are permitted
to assume that to some degree Cinema 1 and Cinema 2 are
already schizoanalytic, albeit in ways we have yet to properly
understand. The author makes a direct link between cinema and
schizoanalysis by highlighting the significance of delirium to
both. This paper argues that the royal road to a schizoanalysis of
cinema is via delirium rather than dream or fantasy. It goes on to
show how Deleuze and Guattari’s formalisation of delirium as a
“regime of signs” can be used to inaugurate a new kind of semi-
ology of cinema.
Cine?mas 16, 2-3:Cinémas 16, 2-3  02/03/07  15:12  Page 117
Que demande la schizo-analyse ? Rien
d’autre qu’un peu de vraie relation
avec le dehors, un peu de réalité réelle.
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari,
L’anti-Œdipe1
Is a schizoanalysis of cinema possible? My instinct is to answer
unreservedly, “yes, it is possible,” but reason makes me more cau-
tious and doubtful. I cannot but be conscious of the dishearten-
ing thought that if Deleuze had wanted such a thing surely he
would have invented it himself. Certainly there is nothing more
striking in Deleuze’s writing than the apparent discontinuity
between Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus and the books he
wrote immediately afterwards, Cinema 1 and Cinema 2. With
the exception of the concept of “deterritorialisation,” itself used
sparingly, but tellingly as we’ll see, there is no cross-over of con-
cepts from one project to the next. There is no discussion, for
example, of the body without organs of cinema, nor indeed
either its abstract machine or assemblage. This is despite the fact
that he and Guattari insisted in the earlier books that these are
the essential building blocks of all phenomena. However, for that
precise reason we can perhaps permit ourselves to be somewhat
more sanguine about the possibility of a schizoanalysis of cinema
than my initial scepticism allowed. If for Deleuze and Guattari
these three concepts—Deleuzism’s own “holy trinity”—describe
the essential building blocks of all phenomena, and it is clear
that in their eyes they do (as they write on the first page of A
Thousand Plateaus, what they have to say applies to “all things”
[toute chose]), then it is impossible for there not to be a body
without organs, an abstract machine and assemblage of cinema.2
The real question then isn’t whether a schizoanalysis of cinema is
possible—Deleuze always said questions of possibility were use-
less questions anyway—but how can it be realised?
Along these lines, then, there are two propositions I want to
advance:
1) Delirium is to schizoanalysis as dream is to psychoanalysis:
as such it is the essential touchstone for a schizoanalysis of cine-
ma.
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2) The tripartite conceptual schema of a body without
organs, an abstract machine and assemblage informs the basic
matrix of Deleuze’s account of the cinematic image: as such, it is
already schizoanalytic in its conception.
My procedure in what follows is to look for functional equiva-
lences—that is, rather than trace the lineage of specific words
and images, I focus on “diagrams” that in the manner of little
machines perform essentially the same function from one book
to the next. I disagree then with those readings of Deleuze which
insist on a discontinuity between one aspect of his work and the
next. By contrast, I take the view that Deleuze’s concepts are
migratory (in the sense in which information systems engineers
speak of the migration of data). I will first of all try to map the
functional equivalences I have been able to trace connecting
Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus to Cinema 1 and Cinema 2.
I will then endeavour to show the implications of this for a study
of cinema. The real work to be done in this project, which obvi-
ously extends beyond the reach of this preliminary attempt, is
ultimately to show how Deleuze and Guattari’s system can be
made operative, which is to say put to use reading films.
1. Delirium is to schizoanalysis as dream is to psychoanalysis
“Schizoanalysis proposes to reach those regions of the orphan
unconscious—indeed ‘beyond all law’—where the problem of
Oedipus can no longer even be raised.” (Deleuze and Guattari
1977, pp. 81-82). For Deleuze and Guattari the royal road to
the unconscious is not the dream, it is delirium. Delirium is
generally regarded as a type of madness, or in the very least an
aberration of the mind that if one is lucky will pass quickly
without leaving a scar. But we can also become quite attached to
our deliriums—as Coetzee (2006, p. 6) says, there is nothing
more dismaying in literature than Don Quixote’s renunciation
of his delirious quest, which is in effect a renunciation not only
of the imagination itself, but of everything that made his life
interesting. The delirious see, hear and feel things, which to the
outside observer appears “made up,” a kind of fantasy or fig-
ment of the imagination. Don Quixote’s windmills. Despite
medical and psychiatric conventions to the contrary, everyday
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life brims with examples of a generalised acceptance of deliri-
um—when we say a goose has walked over our grave are we not
trying to articulate the feeling of having sensed something that
doesn’t belong to this world? Or more exactly, have we not
sensed something that can only be sensed, something that can-
not be put into words? The Wolf-Man could feel himself
becoming a wolf, although he knew very well he wasn’t about to
sprout fur and grow fangs. To the delirious, such feelings are
fully real; the sensations are as gripping as they are confusing
and inarticulable. The Wolf-Man’s “mental distress” derived
from the fact that he couldn’t explain this feeling to his analysts,
Freud and Brunswick, without it being misheard as a fantasy
symptomatic of his Oedipal relation with his mother and father.
He could never convey the “wolfness” of this feeling. For Freud,
the wolf is the father, full stop. But this is not how the Wolf-
Man felt about the wolves in his dream. As Deleuze and
Guattari argue, his feelings were rather more complex than that.
On three quite prominent occasions, Deleuze and Guattari use
examples drawn from cinema to articulate the significance of
what they mean by delirium to an understanding of schizo-
analysis considered primarily as a therapeutic enterprise. 
How does a delirium begin? Perhaps the cinema is able to cap-
ture the movement of madness, precisely because it is not analyt-
ical and regressive, but explores a global field of coexistence.
Witness a film by Nicholas Ray [Bigger than Life 3], supposedly
representing the formation of a cortisone delirium: an over-
worked father, a high-school teacher who works overtime for a
radio-taxi service and is being treated for heart trouble. He
begins to rave about the education system in general, the need to
restore a pure race, the salvation of the social and moral order,
then passes to passes to religion, the timeliness of a return to the
Bible, Abraham (Deleuze and Guattari 1977, p. 274).
“What the film shows so well,” they continue, is that “every
delirium is first of all the investment of a field that is social, eco-
nomic, political, cultural, racial and racist, pedagogical and reli-
gious” and only secondarily familial or oedipal (Deleuze and
Guattari 1977, p. 274). His family is made to bear the brunt of
his ravings, but they are merely the focal point for a delirium
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that exceeds the family on all sides and could quite easily be
extended well past its present borders. 
The fact has often been overlooked that the schizo indeed partic-
ipates in history; he hallucinates and raves universal history, and
proliferates the races. All delirium is racial, which does not nec-
essarily mean racist. It is not a matter of the regions of the body
without organs “representing” races and cultures. The full body
does not represent anything at all. On the contrary, the races and
cultures designate the regions on this body—that is, zones of
intensities, fields of potentials (Deleuze and Guattari 1977,
p. 85). 
The different races are like so many circles of hell (to adapt a
phrase from Deleuze and Guattari) radiating outwards from a
single point which the schizo can never seem to escape no mat-
ter how far he travels. The second example shows this even more
strongly, only now the races have been supplanted by animals.
I recall the fine film Willard (1972, Daniel Mann). A “B” movie
perhaps, but a fine unpopular film: unpopular because the
heroes are rats. . . . Willard lives with his authoritarian mother in
the old family house. Dreadful oedipal atmosphere. His mother
orders him to destroy a litter of rats. He spares one (or two or
several). After a violent argument, the mother, who “resembles”
a dog, dies. The house is coveted by a businessman, and Willard
is in danger of losing it. He likes the principal rat he saved, Ben,
who proves to be of prodigious intelligence. There is also a white
female rat, Ben’s companion. Willard spends all his free time
with them. They multiply (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 233).
Willard’s relation to Ben is intriguing to Deleuze and
Guattari because it cannot be contained within the prefabricat-
ed oedipal mould. Ben isn’t his pet. He is as much Willard’s
nemesis as friend. He interrupts the Oedipalising circuits of
Willard’s various half-hearted or at any rate half-witted attempts
to play the role of the man from the suburbs who has a nice
house, a good steady job and a pleasant girlfriend not even the
most fastidious of mothers could object to. He gives over the
entire basement of his house to Ben and his teeming progeny;
he brings his rats to work with him; he feels ill at ease with his
girlfriend Joan, played by a more anaemic than usual Sondra
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Locke, because he knows the rats view his relationship with her
as a betrayal. Willard’s relation to the rats is ambivalent at best.
He tries to contain the rats to the cellar, but it’s futile. “I’m the
boss here” he tells them, but they know better. The rats eat too
much, they become a burden. What’s more, the plainly malevo-
lent Ben isn’t his favourite rat, the meeker Socrates is, but he
stupidly allows Socrates to be killed. Even so, Ben exerts a
strange power of fascination Willard can’t ignore. His relation-
ship—a “demonic pact,” Deleuze and Guattari call it—with
Ben gives him the strength to deal with his overbearing boss, the
brutish Mr Martin, played by Ernest Borgnine, but at the same
time Willard is quite prepared to sacrifice Ben in the process.
Willard says to his boss: “You made me hate myself. Well, now I
like myself.” With that the rats attack and kill the boss. Willard
closes the door, leaving the rats behind him—“Goodbye Ben”
he says. He then goes home and drowns all the rats in his base-
ment. Afterwards, Joan comes to his house. He tells her. “My
life is changed now—two things did it: Socrates and you.
Tomorrow I’m going to start over. I’m not afraid anymore.”
Then he sees Ben and he knows it is all over. He shepherds Joan
out the door to make ready for what we all know is the final
showdown. The very walls of the house seethe with rats. There
is no stopping them. The rats eat him.
Willard raises essentially the same questions as Hitchcock’s
The Birds. Hitchcock’s film is more enigmatic because the ani-
mal behaviour it depicts isn’t at all bird-like, whereas the rats in
Willard behave more or less as we expect them to, though
doubtless people with bird phobias find nothing to query in it.
By the same token, Melanie evinces no particular fascination for
birds, and in contrast to Willard we’re given no inkling as to
why the animals should choose to attack her. She doesn’t pro-
voke the birds as Willard does the rats, nor do the birds appear
preternaturally hostile as does Ben. For that reason, psycho-
analysis has always tried to make the birds stand for something,
usually something that would otherwise be invisible, such as the
id or superego.4 But having said that, it also has to be acknowl-
edged that neither Willard’s behaviour nor that of his rats is
exactly ordinary—it, too, is peculiar enough to make us wonder
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what is going to happen. In contrast to the psychoanalytic strat-
egy of asking what the birds or rats stand for, Deleuze and
Guattari focus on what they do: the rats, the birds, aren’t repre-
sentations of abstractions like the id or superego, they are “pop-
ulations” living in our heads, but it isn’t the fact that they are
either birds or rats that is vital, what matters rather is the way
they’re organised: it is their swarming that is crucial. And then
only insofar as that swarm draws an “arc of instability” around
the subject, marking the current threshold of deterritorialisation
he or she is about to cross. Hitchcock’s film is exemplary in this
respect: the birds are first presented in their innocuous molar
form—a single bird in a bird shop when Mitch and Melanie
meet, a pair of lovebirds in a cage on the drive to Bodega Bay, a
solitary seagull in a clear sky when Melanie rows to Mitch’s
house. But all that changes quite suddenly, and for no apparent
reason the swarming molecular form emerges and the birds
attack. In short, Hitchcock’s The Birds doesn’t depict what a
delirium looks like so much as capture what it feels like—its
onset is sudden, the birds create radiating circles (the “arc of
instability”) around Melanie from which she can never quite
escape: when one group of birds stop attacking her in one place
another starts somewhere else. 
What is on the screen is delirium in person—what we see is
always inside somebody’s head and for that reason it looks and
feels real, even when it isn’t. In Cinema 1 Deleuze makes this
explicit—the shot acts like a consciousness. “But the sole cine-
matographic consciousness is not us, the spectator, nor the hero;
it is the camera—sometimes human, sometimes inhuman, or
superhuman” (Deleuze 1986, p. 20). The third example I want
to look at takes this a step further. Quoting at length Deleuze’s
close friend Michel Cournot’s account of the function of laugh-
ter in Charlie Chaplin’s films, Deleuze and Guattari (1977,
p. 317) propose that cinema can also produce a delirium of the
spectator. Chaplin’s genius, according to Cournot, was to lead
the viewers outside of themselves such that they cease to identify
with the principal character and begin to experience directly
what Cournot calls “the resistance of the events” that Chaplin’s
character encounters. We have the same surprises, fears, premo-
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nitions and so forth as he does because, psychotically enough,
we have stepped into his position, we occupy his place in the
cinematic consciousness, namely the moving camera. In this
example we have moved from a discussion of the content of the
film to its constitution—the camera’s movement, which in its
ability to subsume the subject position of the hero, but also to
perform inhuman acts of speed and flight, generalises all move-
ment and disorients us, or better, deterritorialises the image: we
no longer see it as simply “theatre” that happens to be filmed.
“In other words, the essence of the cinematographic movement-
image lies in extracting from vehicles or moving bodies the
movement which is their common substance, or extracting from
movements the mobility which is their essence” (Deleuze 1986,
p. 23). We enter into cinema’s phenomenological space—its
“atmosphere” to use Deleuze and Guattari’s term—as one enters
a delirium: we cease to judge in terms of true and false, real and
possible, and so on, and embrace instead its peculiar strain of
“réalité réelle.” Two decades later, in Cinema 1, Deleuze takes
this position to its logical limit. In the discussion of framing,
which we’ll have occasion to look at again in more detail in a
moment, Deleuze (1986, pp. 14-15) says the following: 
The cinematographic image is always dividual. This is because,
in the final analysis, the screen, as the frame of frames, gives a
common standard of measurement to things which do not have
one—long shots of countryside and close-ups of the face, an
astronomical system and a single drop of water—parts which do
not have the same denominator of distance, relief or light. In all
these senses the frame ensures a deterritorialisation of the image. 
Outside of the darkened confines of the theatre only the seri-
ously deranged could make the kinds of global comparisons
routinely constructed by the cinematic image. 
Cinema is delirium. This is the meaning of Bergson’s thesis,
that the movement “as physical reality in the external world, and
the image, as psychic reality in consciousness, could no longer
be opposed,” upon which Deleuze (1986, p. xiv) bases his entire
philosophy of cinema. If cinema is delirium we need a theory of
delirium to form the basis of a schizoanalysis of cinema. In a
marvellous couple of pages in A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and
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Guattari link the birth of psychiatry and psychoanalysis to the
problems to thought posed by delirium. “In the first years of the
twentieth century, psychiatry, at the height of its clinical skills,
confronted the problem of nonhallucinatory delusions in which
the mental integrity is retained without ‘intellectual diminish-
ment’” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 119). The great psychi-
atric thinkers of the period, Esquirol, Kraeplin, Sérieux, Capgras
and Clérambault were able to identify two main groups of delu-
sional behaviours, each with their own distinct etiologies, which
Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 120) designate as “signifying” or
“passional” and “post-signifying” or “subjective.” The first
regime has five key features: its onset is insidious; it has a hid-
den centre which bears witness to endogenous forces organised
around an idea (for this reason Deleuze and Guattari also
describe this particular delusion-formation as ideational in con-
trast with the second type which is active); it creates a “gliding
atmosphere” capable of linking any kind of incident; it is organ-
ised in a series of constantly expanding radiating circles which
the individual must jump between (the “family,” the “analyst,”
and so on); and lastly its atmosphere can be changed by the
irruption of secondary centres clustering around the principal
nucleus of the “idea.” The second regime has three key features:
its onset is sudden, usually triggered “by a decisive external
occurrence, by a relation with the outside that is expressed more
as an emotion than an idea and more as effort or action than
imagination” (which is why it is described as an active rather
than ideational delusion); instead of a “gliding atmosphere” per-
vading the entirety of one’s existence, it operates in a precisely
localised sector; its movement is linear rather than radiating,
usually taking the form of a limited “series” or “proceeding” that
comes to an end only to commence again  elsewhere. The first
regime, then, is an idea or thought we can’t shake (like Woody
Allen when he said, “If it is not one thing, it’s your mother”),
whereas the second is a path we are impelled to follow (like
Beckett when he said “It is not as if I wanted to write”). 
If we consider the two types of intact delusions, we can say peo-
ple in the first group seem to be completely mad, but aren’t:
President Schreber developed his radiating paranoia and
Is a Schizoanalysis of Cinema Possible? 125
Cine?mas 16, 2-3:Cinémas 16, 2-3  02/03/07  15:12  Page 125
 relations with God in every direction, but was not mad in that
he remained capable of managing his wealth wisely and distin-
guishing between circles. At the other pole are those who do not
seem mad in any way, but are, as borne out by their sudden
actions, such as quarrels, arsons, murders . . . (Deleuze and
Guattari 1987, p. 120).
Psychiatry, Deleuze and Guattari argue, was constituted by
this dialectical split pulling it in two contradictory directions at
once, invidiously compelling it to plead for tolerance and open-
door asylums on the one hand and stepped-up surveillance and
security on the other. The problem is exacerbated by the fact
that sane-looking active delusionals are the really dangerous
ones, not the insane-looking ideational delusionals who are by
contrast quite placid. As the old saying goes, “It’s always the
quiet ones you have to watch out for.” No wonder psychiatry
has given rise to so much hostility over the years—psychiatrists
either alarm us by locking up people who appear sane (but
aren’t), or infuriate us by not locking up the people who appear
insane (but aren’t). Is it by chance, Deleuze and Guattari ask,
that these two major types of delusion recapitulate the distinc-
tion between the classes? A paranoid bourgeoisie whose ideas are
radiant and radiating (is this not the meaning of hegemony?)
and a schizophrenic working class reduced to sporadic, highly
localised actions that can but rarely impact on the suzerainty of
the upperclass’s ideas. Activists as diverse as Susan George (from
Attac) and Subcommandante Marcos (Zapatistas) have stressed
that for this reason it is in the realm of ideas that our struggles
against the predations of global capitalism really need to be
fought. But ideas in this sense are the proverbial circles of hell
and the would-be revolutionary simply ends up jumping from
one to another—we need to stop environmental degradation,
we need more jobs, we need wage protection, we need to end
third world poverty, and so on, each idea forestalling the next—
without us ever happening upon the idea that could bring about
a paradigm change. “All paranoiacs are not bourgeois, all pas-
sionals or monomaniacs are not proletarian. But God and his
psychiatrists are charged with recognising, among de facto
mixes, those who preserve, even in delusion, the class-based
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social order, and those who show disorder” (Deleuze and
Guattari 1987, p. 121).
Deleuze and Guattari give the highest priority they can to
the analysis of the regime of signs. Schizoanalysis has no other
object, they say. The regime of signs is what we presuppose in
order to make meaning. I won’t rehearse in detail here Deleuze
and Guattari’s (1987, pp. 111-112) full account of what a
regime of signs is, suffice it to point out two things: first, it is
a conception of semiology in which the signifier does not have
primacy; second, it is a conception of semiology “in which
language never has universality in itself.” The implications of
this for an analysis of cinema are surprising. What results, as I
will explain in more detail below, is a strange kind of formal-
ism that is at once rigorously deterministic and yet open to
variation. There are other “regimes of signs,” as Deleuze and
Guattari label these delusion-formations, but these are the two
most common, or predominant, in Western capitalist society.
Each entails a way of seeing the world that is quite distinct
from the other, even though it is rare to encounter such ways
of seeing in their pure form. Psycho analysis, Deleuze and
Guattari argue, only recognises one regime of signs, the signi-
fying, and to its shame whenever it encounters another type it
applies its own unique variety of thaumaturgy to transform it
into something it recognises. “The Wolf-Man keeps howling:
Six Wolves! Seven Wolves! Freud says, How’s that? Goats, you
say? How interesting. Take away the goats and all you have left
is a wolf, so it’s your father…” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987,
p. 38).  One positive implication we may draw from this,
however, is that, like a watch which has stopped, psychoanaly-
sis is right some of the time—the signifying regime does oper-
ate the way they say it does. The problem is that “interpreta-
tion” of the type psychoanalysis is justly famous for is a
symptom of this regime of signs in full flight, rather than a
pathway to a cure. 
Your wife looked at you with a funny expression. And this
morning the mailman handed you a letter from the IRS and
crossed his fingers. Then you stepped in a pile of dog shit. You
saw two sticks on the sidewalk positioned like the hands of a
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watch. They were whispering behind your back when you
arrived at the office. It doesn’t matter what it means, it’s still
signifying (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 112).  
Hence the interminability of the so-called “talking cure,” which
Freud himself acknowledged, not a little despairingly, towards
the end of his life. Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 113) state
matters even more sternly. “Nothing is ever over and done with
in a regime of this kind. It’s made for that, it’s the tragic regime
of infinite debt, to which one is simultaneously debtor and
creditor.”
The regime of signs systematises the condition of production
of the delirium—it doesn’t render a delirium legible to us, so
much as reveal its consistency. We can see how it is formed and
how it reproduces itself. Deleuze’s cinema books propose two
cinematic variants of regimes of signs: the movement-image and
the time-image, each in their distinct way a theory of the condi-
tion of the production of the cinematic image. These concepts
articulate the consistency of the image under the sign of histo-
ry—both of the medium itself, that is, the history of its artistic
and technical innovations, and of the world itself, as the essen-
tial backdrop of all forms of creativity. The history of cinema as
Deleuze writes it—he sometimes calls it a “natural history”—
fuses these two aspects of history by treating the image types
(rather than specific instances of the image, about which he is
always extremely judicious, just as liable to applaud as rebuke)
as the best they can be in the circumstances in which they are
produced. “The history of cinema is a long martyrology”
(Deleuze 1986, p. xiv). In his own unforced way, Deleuze
(1989, p. 126) himself alerts us to this convergence between the
regime of signs and his history of types of cinematographic
images when he writes: “Two regimes of the image can be con-
trasted point by point; an organic regime and a crystalline
regime, or more generally a kinetic regime and a chronic
regime.” He maps out four key points of comparison and in
doing so reveals very clearly the extent to which his thinking on
cinema is indebted to his earlier work, and not just at the level
of a generalised commitment to transcendental empiricism, but
at the more practical and idiosyncratic level of the formal archi-
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tecture of his concepts. The four ordinal points are as follows:
1) description; 2) the relation between the real and the imagi-
nary; 3) narration; and 4) truth. They canvas, respectively, what
in a more traditional cinema studies vernacular is known as: set-
ting, the supposedly pre-existing reality cinema either records or
projects; sequencing or continuity, although these aren’t quite
the right words—the mental operation we have constantly to
perform to make sense of the stream of images cinema presents;
dramatisation, the weaving together of action and space; and
truth, the conviction that what we are witnessing is really hap-
pening in the possible world of the cinema, something that the
evolution of dream sequences and the like would cast into
doubt. 
The cinematic regime, as I will refer to it in order to align it
with the parent notion of the regime of signs, consists of these
four elements in a state of dynamic interaction. Change at the
level of the image occurs when one or more of these elements is
pushed beyond its present limits in such a way that it doesn’t
bring about a generalised collapse of the regime, but opens up
new “vistas of possibility,” to use one of Guattari’s formulations.
Deleuze is always quite careful to stipulate that the shift from
the movement-image, which was the first form of cinematic
image to be invented, to the time-image, which was the second,
and so far the only other form of cinematic image to be invent-
ed, cannot be conceived as progress. 
There is no value-judgement here, because this new regime—no
less than the old one—throws up its ready-made formulas, its set
procedures, its laboured and empty applications, its failures, its
conventional and “second-hand” examples offered to us as mas-
terpieces. What is interesting is the new status of the image, this
new type of narration-description in so far as it initially inspires
very different great authors [auteurs] (Deleuze 1989, p. 132).5
Under the umbrella of these two major forms of the image,
there are dozens of complex and highly original permutations,
which is what gives cinema its interest. The point to be borne in
mind here is that the image has a “deep structure” which func-
tions as its immanent condition of possibility, determining what
can and cannot be incorporated. Slavoj Zizek provides a vivid
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illustration of what is at stake here when he asks us to imagine a
pornographic sex scene inserted in the middle of Out of Africa.
In effect, when he argues that this is impossible to conceive
without it radically altering the movie, he is saying that the
regime of signs underpinning it is incompatible with the regime
of signs we call pornography (Zizek 1991, p. 111). The actual
film doesn’t need to show “all” because its regime is constituted
in such a way that everything the camera “touches” is imbued
with significance, thus a “gliding atmosphere” of eroticism is
established that constantly radiates outwards from the idea of
what might take place in the privacy of the bedroom. To show
“all” would realign this heady atmosphere so that instead of
radiating waves of eroticism there would be a linear sequence
leading from the first kiss to the bedroom where the act would
be consummated and then the whole sequence would need to
be restarted elsewhere. It shouldn’t be thought from this that it
is always impossible to mix different regimes, because that isn’t
the case: but it is the case that regimes can only be mixed under
certain conditions. We may add, too, that what we take to be
the most exciting works are very often the products of mixed
regimes.6
Delirium is a royal road to a schizoanalysis of cinema because
its perceptual regime can be formalised. In the next section we
need to consider how the cinematic regime of signs is realised by
looking at cinema’s own “holy trinity,” at least according to
Deleuze, of the shot, frame and montage. The regime of signs is
a form of expression—shot, frame and montage comprise the
corresponding form of content.
2. Deleuze’s account of the cinematic image is already
schizoanalytic
I. The Cinematic Regime
Deleuze and Guattari’s revision of psychoanalysis doesn’t take
the form of a wholesale repudiation of Freud, as most people
seem to think. Their tendency, rather, is to attempt to unblock
the blockages in his thought. Very often, as is the case with delir-
ium, they are more than willing to credit him with great clinical
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discoveries, only to then shake their heads in disappointment
that he didn’t realise the true nature of his insight. Their general
assessment of Freud is that he understood neurosis, but psychosis
escaped him. Even so, Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 27)
attribute to Freud’s 1915 paper “The Unconscious” the clinical
discovery of the difference between neurosis and psychosis: 
Freud says that hysterics or obsessives are people capable of mak-
ing a global comparison between a sock and a vagina, a scar and
castration, etc. Doubtless it is at one and the same time they
apprehend the object globally and perceive it as lost. Yet it would
never occur to a neurotic to grasp the skin erotically as a multi-
plicity of pores, little spots, little scars or black holes, or to grasp
the sock erotically as a multiplicity of stitches. . . . Comparing a
sock to a vagina is OK, it’s done all the time, but you’d have to
be insane to compare a pure aggregate of stitches to a field of
vaginas: that’s what Freud says. 
Deleuze and Guattari describe this observation as a great clin-
ical discovery because it clarifies the difference between the two
types of pathologies we know commonly as neurosis and psy-
chosis and as we’ve seen sets the stage for their own investiga-
tions. What is at stake here is the difference between two
regimes of signs—the “signifying” and “passional.” In their eyes,
Freud stood on the threshold of making the discovery of “the
greatest art of the unconscious,” namely the art of “molecular
multiplicities,” but somehow he botched it. Having served him
so well in so many other situations, Freud’s unshakeable convic-
tion that all “dream-thoughts” can be treated sensibly, as
 representations of one kind or another—a sock for a vagina, a
wolf for daddy, and so on—left him unable to grasp the peculiar
form of action and ideation known as delirium. Although
mindful of the fact that this correspondence appears to break
down in the case of psychosis, Freud nonetheless pins his hopes
on the power of the proper name to restore unity to thoughts
and ideas that seem to be fleeing from his grasp. The Wolf-Man
has an obsession with wolves, Freud thinks, but this is just a
screen for his true state of mind and all his symptoms can be
explained by isolating the central fact of his passive attitude
towards his father. His imperious gaze, that of the “one
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 supposed to know” prevents him from seeing that the boy in the
dream isn’t just looking at the wolves, they are looking at him,
or more particularly reaching out to him. “A fibre stretches from
a human to an animal, from a human or an animal to mole-
cules, from molecules to particles, and so on to the impercepti-
ble. Every fibre is a Universe fibre” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987,
p. 249).
Here Deleuze and Guattari make what is, I think, their single
most important intervention into dream analysis. Freud, they
cry, thinks that the boy of the famous dream of the five wolves
in the tree is looking at the wolves. But aren’t the wolves also
looking at him? “Freud obviously knows nothing about the fas-
cination exerted by wolves and the meaning of their silent call,
the call to become-wolf. Wolves watch, intently watch, the
dreaming child; it is so much more reassuring to tell oneself that
it is really the child who sees the dogs or parents in the act of
making love” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 28). Watching-
wolves could still be daddy, to be sure, but to acknowledge that
the wolves are watching the boy and not merely obscuring
thoughts of his father via the process Freud termed dreamwork
is already to insist on the importance of something Freud more
or less ignores, namely the spatial arrangement of the dream ele-
ments. The wolves are just outside the window, watching, wait-
ing, threatening, but in an obscure manner. What are they wait-
ing for? If they wanted to attack, why do they hesitate? Is there
something holding them back? If they aren’t about to attack,
then what is their purpose? What do they watch for? Are they
perhaps waiting for someone to join them? We see more clearly
what Deleuze and Guattari are trying to do when they offer
Kafka’s short story, “Jackals and Arabs,” as a parallel example.
The Jackals, too, watch and wait, on the edge of the camp,
thereby creating, as they explain, three different kinds of spaces
which we can designate as follows: inside the camp, outside the
camp, and the boundary between the two. The Wolf-Man’s
dream exhibits the same three types of spaces: inside the bed-
room, outside the bedroom, and the boundary between the two.
One can specify the difference between these two positions very
simply: it is the difference between being inside or outside a
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particular space and being an insider or an outsider. Jackals and
Wolves are outsiders regardless of whether they are inside or
outside the camp or bedroom, which is what makes them so
fearful. It is not the topography that governs the distribution or
peopling of these spaces, but the other way round: it is the dis-
tribution or peopling that creates the topography. If this were a
film instead of a dream we would say: it is the camera that cre-
ates the distribution that in turn creates the topography.
If we draw a diagram of the Wolf-Man’s dream taking
account of where the wolves are in relation to the boy, the first
thing we notice is that the boy is on the outer edge of the pack.
We know he’s part of the pack because the wolves are in his
head; they are his people—but the fact that they are standing in
the cold, hiding out in a skeletal tree in the middle of an
immense barren space, tells us his relation to them is uncertain.
What sinews reach out to him to bind him to the group? How
does he relate to them? Why is it so dark and cold? These are
the second and third things, respectively, that we should notice
about the spatial arrangement of the dream. The interesting
question, then, is how does the boy in the dream feel? I don’t
mean how does the Wolf-Man feel. We know the answer to
that, or at least we have an answer to that—he says he felt terri-
fied, that he was in great danger. But his fear is nameless. He
half-heartedly ascribes it to a fear of being eaten, but we are no
less unconvinced by that than Deleuze and Guattari. It doesn’t
ring true somehow. Our attention is drawn to what the Wolf-
Man specifies as the only action in the dream—the opening of
the bedroom window. This is a threshold moment in the dream:
Is he an insider or outsider? Obviously the boy is inside the four
walls of his bedroom, but those walls no longer seem to contain
him. He doesn’t feel as though he belongs there.7 The wolves are
watching him, but perhaps not as predators salivating over their
prey, as he at first fears, but as compassionate outsiders who
recognise their own—the Wolf-Man feels like he is part of the
pack. That’s where he belongs. If he’s an insider at all it is as a
member of the wolf pack watching him from the tree, not the
family sleeping in the bedrooms down the corridor. They’re out
in the cold and so is he. But this is a giant step to make and he
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hesitates. The frozen wasteland he can see from his window is
his plane of immanence, his body without organs. Freud makes
no mention of the geography underpinning the spatial arrange-
ment of the dream.8 He imbues the wolves with significance,
but not the snow. In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari downplay
the significance of the wolves, except to observe that they are
species that hunt and live in packs; but play up the significance
of the snow, or at least its icy emptiness. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s delirium-centred dream analysis
 doesn’t ask what the wolves in the tree mean, but what does this
distribution of wolves on that plane tell us about the boy’s state
of mind? How is it working? We can observe that his mental
topography and physical geography are at odds with one anoth-
er. He is an insider where he is not and an outsider where he is.
His feet are in one place and his head another. What Deleuze
and Guattari describe as becoming-wolf is precisely this process
of leaving one formation where one is an insider for another—
we become-wolf to the extent that we start to feel like outsiders
in human company and insiders in the company of wolves
who’ve taken up residence in our heads. The wolves mark the
limit-point of our present state of “humanity;” they are the
point beyond which we are no longer the same person. This
affinity does not imply that one identifies with wolves, or feels
in any way wolf-like (which is why the designation “Wolf-Man”
is  really an abuse). The space of the dream appears vast and
unlimited, but in reality it is a closed system, a regime of
signs—it cannot admit any changes of detail without it chang-
ing the whole. A trace of blood, a swirling leaf, tracks in the
snow, even the smallest detail alters everything. But rather than
continue to think of it in pathological terms, I want to shift the
discussion back to the schizoanalysis of cinema by viewing it,
experimentally, as a film image. I have said that the royal road
for schizoanalysis is the delirium not the dream, so it may
appear that I’m going back on my word by focusing on this
example. However I think there is good reason to plead that this
is a special case of a dream which has the quality of a delirium,
or as it might also be said with some justice, a delirium that
took the form of a dream. As Freud (1990, pp. 263-264) notes,
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the dream has a “lasting sense of reality” which the Wolf-Man
himself seemed to think deserved notice. Freud takes this as his
starting point because according to his experience this indicates
that the dream recollects in its own uniquely transfigured way
some real event. We may simply say that in the manner of all
deliriums it felt real to the Wolf-Man—the wolves were in his
head; they were alive to him, and whether or not they sprang
from the pages of half-remembered fairy tales they clearly had
more substance, more flesh and blood, than mere figments of a
dream.9
It will be recalled that the cinematic regime consists of the
following four dynamic elements (these elements are realised
through the agencies of framing, shot and montage, which I will
deal with in more detail in a moment): 
1) description; 
2) the relation between the real and the imaginary; 
3) narration;
4) truth. 
What is crucial concerning description, Deleuze (1989,
p. 126) says, is whether or not the setting stands for a “suppos-
edly pre-existing reality” or creates its own reality or realities,
which constantly give way to other realities that “contradict, dis-
place, or modify the preceding ones.” It is clear that Freud treats
it as belonging to the first type, what Deleuze calls the organic
regime, which implies that the reality of the dream comes from
the outside, whereas Deleuze and Guattari categorise it as
belonging to the second type, namely the crystalline regime,
which means the reality of the dream is at once self-generating
and unstable. The dream doesn’t occur in his bedroom, but a
bedroom, and as the window opens—which it does all by
itself—the room itself seems to change nature: it is no longer a
bedroom looking out on a frosty landscape in which there
stands a tree with wolves on it, but rather, impossibly enough, a
bedroom in a frosty landscape in which there stands a tree with
wolves on it. If it looked like his bedroom to begin with it was
sheerly a matter of habit. Turning more directly to Deleuze’s
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work on cinema, we may observe that the Wolf-Man’s passivity
is consistent, too, with the crystalline regime, which Deleuze
says is the cinema of the seer [voyant] not the agent [actant]: he
doesn’t react to his situation, he records it. His situation “out-
strips his motor capacities on all sides,” and, as Deleuze (1989,
p. 3) puts it, “makes him see and hear what is no longer subject
to the rules of a response or an action.” His situation is patently
that of the child, which as Deleuze notes was of central impor-
tance to the development of neo-realism because in his or her
motor helplessness the child is astute watcher and listener of
what goes on around them. The child absorbs the world.11
Quite obviously, the second element, the relation between the
real and the imaginary, follows from the first. In the organic
regime the distinction between the real and imaginary is rigor-
ously maintained—even if the film consists largely of dream
sequences, there is always a perspective point of the real which
serves to differentiate one kind of image from the other. The
ontology of the pre-existing reality is preserved, even if inter-
rupted, by “the continuity shots which establish it and by the
laws which determine successions, simultaneities and perma-
nences: it is a regime of localisable relations, actual linkages,
legal, causal and logical connections” (Deleuze 1989, pp. 126-
27). There is always a consciousness in which the dream
sequences can be actualised, and the various illogicalities of
sequencing rationalised. Think of the way the Dalí-designed
sequence in Spellbound (Hitchcock, 1945) is carefully corralled
by a plot that makes it into an intelligible “truth” so there’s
never any doubt that what we’re witnessing is a dream firmly
connected to a pre-existing reality. One has only to compare this
to David Lynch’s Mulholland Drive to see what happens when
this model of structuration is dispensed with and the organic
regime gives way to the crystalline. Here there is no overarching
plot to position the dream as a dream and render it intelligible.
We can no longer discern a perspective point of the real which
can reliably differentiate the dream image from the supposedly
real and consequently we find ourselves absorbed by a game of
cat and mouse in which the virtual and actual seem to be chas-
ing each other. 
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In apparent contradiction of our initial findings, the Wolf-
Man’s dream would seem to be a clear-cut case of an organic
regime, and not crystalline as just described, inasmuch as the
dream seems to be clearly differentiated from reality and firmly
anchored in his consciousness. Yet on closer examination, our
impression soon changes and we find our first thought is con-
firmed. If we follow Freud as he elicits the Wolf-Man’s associat-
ed memories that supposedly “explain” the dream, we start to
wonder where the dream begins and ends: we move from a pic-
ture of a rampant wolf in an illustrated book of fairy tales to
flocks of fluffy white sheep on the family estate, and from there
to an epidemic in the flock and a failed attempt at a cure and
the resulting pile of sheep corpses; then there is grandfather’s
story, although which he can’t recall whether he heard it before
or after the dream, tells the tale of tailor who pulls the tail of a
wolf and supposedly explains the presence of the tree in the
dream; as for the number of wolves in the dream this is conve-
niently accounted for by a “forced” recollection of the fairy
story “The Wolf and the Seven Little Goats.” Which is real? The
dream or the memory it allegedly condenses? In terms of narra-
tion the difference between the two regimes turns on whether
the characters act or react to their situation. Freud clearly wants
the Wolf-Man to tell a story and in doing so to connect all the
flotsam and jetsam of “free association” he can dredge up in a
logical and precise way. One could imagine how this might be
filmed: you’d start with the dream image and then in a quite
mechanical way the camera would cut between a page torn from
a fairy tale book to sheep in a paddock; and from there to a little
boy listening to his grandfather telling him a bedtime story (for
added effect an animated version of this tale might be inserted);
and then back to another fairy tale, and so on. At the centre of
it all would be Freud, the analyst, his consciousness connecting
the apparently random chain of associations and securing their
coherence, in the last instance. The crystalline regime would, in
contrast, be achieved by eliminating the analyst’s unconscious as
the centre of meaning.
“A fourth point, more complex or more general, follows on
from this. If we take the history of thought, we see that time has
Is a Schizoanalysis of Cinema Possible? 137
Cine?mas 16, 2-3:Cinémas 16, 2-3  02/03/07  15:12  Page 137
always put the notion of truth into crisis” (Deleuze 1989,
p. 130). Deleuze refers to this problem as the “crisis of contin-
gent futures.” “If it is true that a naval battle may take place
tomorrow, how are we to avoid one of the true following conse-
quences: either the impossible proceeds from the possible (since,
if the battle takes place, it is no longer possible that it may not
take place), or that the past is not necessarily true (since the bat-
tle could not have taken place)” (Deleuze 1989, p. 130). From
this, Deleuze says, a new status of narration arises—Deleuze
characterises this new possibility of narration as the “power of
the false.” The false is not the untrue, as such, but rather the
undecidable. In cinema, it comes into being when the virtual
ceases to be a derivative of the actual and takes on a life of its
own (Deleuze 1989, p. 127). This is the moment when choices
not made, the choices that couldn’t be made: the choices that
were never made; the fanciful, frightening and impossible choic-
es we are all confronted with in everyday life suddenly become
as real to us as the choices we consciously do make. Is there a
better definition of the potency of delirium? Again, Hitchcock’s
The Birds is an instructive example. Whatever could have hap-
pened for the birds to behave that way? To start attacking people
like that? Is it something in Melanie’s past or in her present that
makes them attack her like that? The false is the problematic. It
is a delicate power, Deleuze (1989, p. 146) says, but it is also
“the only chance for art or life,” by which he means, it is the
power of chance itself. From the point of view of cinema, the
key issue is which direction the impetus for narrative movement
comes from. In the case of The Birds that impelling force comes
from the outside, not from within, which is undoubtedly why
critics have always been ambivalent about it. The inexplicable
logic of the story’s development compels us to search beyond
the confines of the situation for an answer. Similarly, any
attempt to read the birds as symbols tends to fail because there
is no consistency in the narrative—they come from nowhere,
attack without reason and cease without being halted. The
impossibility of deciding why the events are taking place calls
into question and literally falsifies our standard means of appre-
hending them. Raymond Bellour’s famous shot by shot analysis
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is in this sense a heroic failure inasmuch as it attempts to estab-
lish a chronicle of events for a mode of narration-description
that destroys the possibility of the chronicle itself.11 It is clear
that the Wolf-Man, too, wonders: whatever could have hap-
pened for me to start feeling this way, to feel like I’m becoming
a wolf? 
II. The Cinematic Apparatus
Having mapped out the extent to which the ordinal points of
the organic and crystalline regime can be coordinated with that
of the signifying and passional regimes of signs, we must now
advance the experiment a step further and inquire at the micro-
scopic level how the image is realised and determine whether
the schizoanalytic apparatus of abstract machine, body without
organs and assemblage applies there as well as it does at the
macroscopic level of the cinematic regime itself. What, in other
words, is the abstract machine, body without organs, and assem-
blage of cinema? This is not the place to rehearse lengthy expla-
nations of the provenance of each of these terms, but it will be
helpful I believe if I briefly give an account of how these three
concepts interconnect to form what I have called Deleuzism’s
“holy trinity.” The abstract machine is encased in the body
without organs, where it functions as its unity of composition.
It is effectuated in concrete reality by the assemblage, where it
 persists as its organising ideal. The body without organs is the
virtual plane of desire created by the abstract machine. The
assemblage, then, is the effectuation of the organisation of desire
elaborated by the body without organs. But as the famous chap-
ter on how to make yourself a body without organs makes clear,
the assemblage is also the plane where we experiment and tinker
to create the body without organs. The abstract machine articu-
lates or connects these two realms, the body without organs and
the assemblage. It has no existence for itself, but subsists or per-
haps insists in the other realms. I am of course aware that these
are at best austere formalisms, at worst empty phrases, so I will
try to give flesh to the skeleton by matching these functional
definitions to the constitutive agencies—the other “holy trini-
ty”—of the cinematic image, namely frame, shot, and montage. 
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The frame is “the determination of a closed system, a relatively
closed system which includes everything which is present in the
image—sets, characters, props” (Deleuze 1986, p. 12). It
exhibits three characteristics which correspond to the threefold
determination (adapted from Marx, Lacan and Spinoza)
Deleuze and Guattari ascribe to the body without organs: first,
following Marx, they define it as a “divine presupposition;” sec-
ond, following Lacan, they say it is like the reverse side of the
Other, a revolt of partial objects or the “real inorganisation” of
desire; and, third, following Spinoza, they define it as an imma-
nent substance—“the partial objects are like its ultimate attrib-
utes, which belong to it precisely insofar as they are really
 distinct and cannot on this account exclude or oppose one
another.”12 The frame is the logic of what we see on the
screen—it is an “art of choosing” whose operation is everywhere
apparent, but nowhere visible itself. We see the results of fram-
ing and feel its effects, but we do not see it. In this sense, it “falls
back on [il se rabat sur] all production constituting a surface
over which the forces and agents of production are distributed,
thereby appointing for itself all surplus production and arrogat-
ing to itself both the whole and the parts of the process, which
now seem to emanate from it as a quasi cause” (Deleuze and
Guattari 1977, p. 10).  But this doesn’t mean these parts are
without their own efficacy, which brings us to Lacan: the parts
of the frame are partial objects or objets petit “a.” It must be
emphasized, though, that framing is what holds the objets petit
“a” together (but not the operation of the objets petit “a” them-
selves, which actually corresponds to the operation of the
abstract machine). The partial objects are
pure positive multiplicities where everything is possible, without
exclusiveness or negation, syntheses operating without a plan,
where the connections are transverse, the disjunctions included,
the conjunctions polyvocal, indifferent to their underlying
support, since this matter that serves them precisely as a support
receives no specificity from any structural or personal unity, but
appears as the body without organs” (Deleuze and Guattari
1977, p. 309).13
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There is nothing “naturally occurring” (not even when it is
Nature itself in the viewfinder) about what we see on the screen,
every element—objet petit “a”—is carefully chosen, but the inter-
actions between the elements cannot be subsumed under some
imagined “phallic” theme. The most we can say is they display
two tendencies: towards rarefaction and saturation, or the
smooth and the striated. Lastly we turn to Spinoza: “The partial
objects and the body without organs are the two material ele-
ments of the schizophrenic desiring-machine [abstract machine]:
the one as the immobile motor, the other as the working parts”
(Deleuze and Guattari 1977, p. 327).
The “working part” of Deleuzism’s “holy trinity” is the assem-
blage. The assemblage maps the intersection of the action of
bodies with the incorporeal transformation of statements—the
prisoner’s body and the judge’s sentence: 
Taking the feudal assemblage as an example, we would have to
consider the body of the earth and the social body; the body of
the overlord, vassal, and serf; the body of the knight and the
horse and their new relation to the stirrup; the weapons and the
tools assuring a symbiosis of bodies. . . . We would also have to
consider the statements, expressions, the juridical regime of
heraldry. . . . We would have to consider how all this combines in
the Crusades (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 89). 
Who does the camera follow? What does the camera see? The shot
is “the determination of the movement which is established in the
closed system, between elements or parts of the set” (Deleuze 1986,
p. 18). More than that, the shot is the primary vehicle of ideology
in cinema—it determines whether we see the workers’ faces, their
hands, their feet, the hard earth they must sleep on and so forth.
Created by the cut, the shot is the “working part” of cinema. It
simultaneously expresses movement within the fixed frame of a set,
the movement of an actor across the screen from right to left, and a
qualitative change in the whole itself, in other words the reason
why that man crossed the screen. The shot is the movement-image
as such. There are three varieties of movement-image: action-image;
perception-image; and affection-image. If we follow an action, but
we neither see what the actor sees, nor know how she feels about
what she is seeing or doing, then we have a pure action-image.
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When we see what the actor sees, not just as a matter of point of
view, but fully as a matter of judgement, that is, when we see what
compels the actor to act (the glint of steel on the horizon indicating
unseen attackers waiting in ambush or the tell-tale facial tic that
reveals a gambler’s position), then we have shifted to the realm of
the perception-image. When the character acts and we see his face
and he is smiling or laughing or crying and we know what he feels
about his situation, then we are in the realm of the affection-image.
These are the basic building blocks of cinema, but as Deleuze
(1986, p. 68) acknowledges there “is every reason to believe that
many other kinds of images can exist.” These three images corre-
spond to the long shot (action-image), medium shot (perception-
image), and close-up (affection-image), but this shouldn’t be treated
as absolute. “A film is never made up of a single kind of image: thus
we call the combination of the three varieties montage. “Montage
(in one of its aspects) is the assemblage [agencement] of movement-
images” (Deleuze 1986, p. 70). 
“What originates from montage, or from the composition of
movement-images is the Idea, that indirect image of time”
(Deleuze 1986, p. 32). Montage is the abstract machine of
 cinema—it joins together the two powers of the frame and the
shot, or more particularly the twin powers of relative and absolute
movement (the movement of individual actors in a particular
sequence and the movement of the narrative as a whole). The
abstract machine of montage is the sense of cinema—it is what
enables the camera to close in or pull away from the subject, to
cut backwards and forwards between two subjects, and so on, and
for that to remain meaningful. “The abstract machine [montage]
sometimes develops upon the plane of consistency [the frame],
whose continuums, emissions, and conjugations it constructs,
and sometimes remains enveloped in a stratum [the shot] whose
unity of composition and force of attraction and prehension it
defines” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 71). The shot may be the
consciousness of cinema and the frame its unconscious, but mon-
tage is thought. For this reason all the great directors, particularly
pioneers such as Eisenstein, Griffith, Gance and Murnau, invest
their “hope” in montage—their manifestos invariably single out
this aspect of the cinema as the most crucial, as the element
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which can finally make “us” think. “Everyone knows that, if an
art necessarily imposed the shock or vibration, the world would
have changed long ago, and men would have been thinking for a
long time. So this pretension of the cinema, at least among the
greatest pioneers, raises a smile today” (Deleuze 1989, p. 157).
But the hope that cinema can change minds by forging new ideas
hasn’t faded, even if it has gotten a little lost in the commercial
demands of the film industry itself.
Conclusion
What I have tried to do, which is of the order of preliminary
spadework, is first of all make a direct link between cinema and
schizoanalysis by highlighting the significance of delirium to both;
second I have shown how Deleuze and Guattari’s reconceptualisa-
tion of delirium as a “regime of signs” can be used to inaugurate a
new kind of semiology of cinema not reliant on unhelpful analo-
gies of the order that cinema is a “kind of language;” and third, I
have shown that, at the most microscopic level, Deleuze’s anatomy
of the image follows the logic of his previous books. There is much
more work to be done, of course, and it is clear that this will have
to concentrate on the “moving parts” of Deleuze’s thought so to
enable us to move past a description of the cinema using schizoan-
alytic terms to a genuine schizoanalysis of it.
Cardiff University
NOTES
1. It is worth noting here that the English translation of this passage —“What does
schizoanalysis ask? Nothing more than a bit of a relation to the outside, a little reality”
(Deleuze and Guattari 1977, p. 334)—downplays the emphasis Deleuze and Guattari
place on schizoanalysis’s need for a non-falsified, non-fantasised, that is to say, true
relation with the outside as the really real. Given the centrality of delirium and,
concomitantly, hallucination, to their thinking, it is perhaps not insignificant that in
trying to articulate the therapeutic goal of schizoanalysis they should be compelled to
resort to a tautological locution like “réalité réelle.” For if the hallucination is real to
the one who hallucinates, then what can be outside that but the really real?
2. “In a book, as in all things, there are lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata
and territories; but also lines of flight, movements of deterritorialisation and
destratification” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 3). 
3. I must thank David Rodowick for identifying this film for me.
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4. I have treated this subject at greater length in Buchanan 2005.
5. I must save for another occasion what seems to me an extremely interesting
comparison to be made here between the different regimes of narration-description
and Bakhtin’s concept of the “chronotope.” At least part of the interest of doing this
would be to enrich our understanding of Bakhtin and dispel the rather simplistic
rendering of chronotope as time-space.
6. To give only one example, I would point to the original CSI: as a crime series,
the action is driven by the reactions of characters to their situation, and clearly
follows a pattern of linear sequences commencing and recommencing. But the central
character, Grissom, has a hearing problem that is occasionally allowed to interrupt
the snapping together of one sequence and another, causing, for a time, a small
shimmering of radiation: he becomes childlike, hearing and seeing his world anew,
observing not acting, and a “gliding” atmosphere of significance takes over.
7. Here we may recall the way the bedroom walls disappear in Maurice Sendak’s
children’s story, Where the Wild Things Are.
8. Symptomatically enough, art historian Hal Foster (2004, pp. 9-12) similarly
pays no attention to the geography of the Wolf-Man’s dream in his consideration of
the famous drawing.
9. The Wolf-Man would later tell Freud that he thought the opening of the
window indicated that in reality he’d opened his eyes, so that what he saw in the trees
belonged to his waking memory and not his dreams.
10. For an examination of the implications of this distinction for an analysis of
space see Buchanan 2006.
11. The least one must say about The Birds is that one cannot say this x led to
that y; each shot, each scene, each event, is rather piled one on top of the other, x and
x and x and so on. Zizek’s (1991, pp. 104-105) interpretive strategy is exemplary in
this regard. In order to make sense of the film and contrive an x leads to y reading, he
instructs us first of all to imagine it as a film without birds. This not only serves to
underscore the birds’ importance, because without them the film becomes, as Zizek
says, a boring family drama, but also confirms that the logic of their presence cannot
be discerned from within.
12. Deleuze and Guattari 1977, p. 10 (my emphasis); 308; 327.
13. It must observed that “Deleuze’s Lacan,” as we might usefully call it, is fully as
original as his Hume or Nietzsche. Deleuze reads Lacan as a thinker who spent his life
trying to get away from Oedipus only to have his acolytes and disciples drag his work
right back where it came from. Lacan, they say, “is not content to turn, like the
analytic squirrel, inside the wheel of the Imaginary and the Symbolic; he refuses to be
caught up in the Oedipal Imaginary and the oedipalising structure, the imaginary
identity of persons and the structural unity of machines, everywhere knocking against
the impasses of a molar representation that the family closes around itself ” (Deleuze
and Guattari 1977, p. 308.)
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